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IMAGINED RIGHTS WITHOUT REMEDY:
THE POLITICS OF NOVEL LEGAL CLAIMS
George Lovell*
Remedies for civil rights violations are only practically availablewhere
government officials choose to empower institutions that can protect
those rights. When the Civil Rights Section (CRS) of the US.
Department of Justice was formed in 1939, almost no federal civil
rights law or institutional capacity existed to protect civil rights. This
Article uses citizens' letters to the CRS to explore the politics of the
CRS's limited and experimental strategy of using litigation to expand
federal civil rights protections.Although the scope of civil rights law
has expanded greatly since the inception of the CRS, the CRS
experience may still indicate that government attorneys typically avoid
combining a litigation strategy with a broader appeal for public
support. Perhaps the larger lesson we can learn from the CRS is that
work that occurs within branches of the government may not produce
meaningful and lasting institutional change; rather, campaigns that
enlist outsiders to take part in broader processes of constitutional
politics may be needed to effect systemic change of this kind.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In December 1943, Baltimore attorney W.A.C. Hughes Jr. wrote
to Victor Rotnem, head of the Department of Justice's Civil Rights
Section (CRS), to report a shocking incident.' Hughes reported an
incident involving Private Thomas Broadus, an African American
soldier on leave from Fort Meade, that occurred on February 1,
1942.2

Police officer Edward Bender accosted Broadus on a Baltimore
street as he and three companions attempted to get into an unlicensed
* Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Washington. glovell@uw.edu.
1. Letter from W.A.C. Hughes, Attorney at Law, to Victor Rotnem, Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice (Dec. 3, 1943), File 144-35-4 (on file with author). This Article refers to letters
from the U.S. Department of Justice's general correspondence files in the National Archives
(Record Group 60, Entry 114, Classified Subject Files). The letters are from file designation
number 144 (Civil Rights), Boxes 17573-17608.

2. Id.
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taxi.3 Newspaper accounts of the incident reveal that several other
passing cab drivers had refused to give Broadus a ride, but the police
officer nevertheless demanded that Broadus call for the services of
one of the licensed white-owned taxi companies.' Broadus and
Officer Bender ended up in an argument in which Broadus reportedly
"said he wanted a colored cab and had a right to spend his money
with whomever he chose."'
At that point, the officer grabbed Broadus, and the two men
tussled on the street for several minutes as the officer repeatedly used
his billy club to strike Broadus on the head. 6 During the struggle,
Broadus managed to regain his footing and tried to run away from
the officer.' The officer rose, took careful aim with both hands at the
hobbling and weakened Broadus, and shot the soldier in the back.'
As Broadus fell to the ground and tried to crawl under a parked car,
the officer shot Broadus a second time.' The officer then walked
toward Broadus and "dared him to move." " He began kicking
Broadus, who remained underneath the car. " The officer threatened
a gathering crowd with his revolver. 12 A man who approached
Officer Bender to offer to transport the unconscious Broadus to the
hospital was threatened and later arrested for interfering with an
officer. 13 A police wagon later transported Broadus to a hospital
where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 14
Hughes's letter noted that Rotnem had expressed some interest
in the Broadus case when they had met at a conference the previous
week. " Hughes included the names and addresses of fourteen

3. Cop Kills Fort Meade Soldier, 26, AFRO-AM. (Balt.) Feb. 3, 1942, at 1, available at
http://news.google.con/newspapers?nid=22 11 &dat-19420203&id=EZ41AAAA
IBAJ&sjid-4_QFAAAAIBAJ&pg=2825,440102.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Letter from W.A.C. Hughes to Victor Rotnem, supra note 1.
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eyewitnesses to the attack who were willing to cooperate in any
investigation.16 He also explained that the state of Maryland had
made halting efforts to respond to Private Broadus's murder. " A
grand jury initially indicated approval of an indictment for Bender
for unlawful homicide but changed its mind two days later, and the
investigation was dropped. The state's attorney refused numerous
requests to reopen the case.1
A committee from the Governor's Commission on Problems
Affecting the Negro Population later conducted a more exhaustive
investigation of the incident. The committee, chaired by a federal
circuit court judge, recommended that the state reopen the case and
file charges against Officer Bender. State prosecutors refused that
recommendation. Bender, who had shot and killed another African
American named Charles Parker in a similar incident a year earlier,
remained on the beat for the Baltimore police. 20
The Broadus case sits at the intersection of two alarmingly
common problems that the CRS's government attorneys were
working to address: police brutality targeting African Americans and
violent attacks on African American servicemen. 2 1 While many cases
of police brutality were reported to the CRS, CRS attorneys decided
to investigate and prosecute in only a very few instances.2 2 In the
Broadus case, Tom Clark, then the head of the Criminal Division of
16. Id.
17. Five Agencies Probe Death of Soldier, AFRO-AM. (Balt.), Feb. 7, 1942, at 1, availableat
http://news.google.corn/newspapers?nid=UBnQDr5gPskC&dat= 9420207&printsec=frontpage.
18. No Indictment of Officer Yet, AFRO-AM. (Balt.), Mar. 3, 1942, at 1, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=UBnQDr5gPskC&dat=1 9420303&printsec=frontpage;
Two Accused by Cop Face Trial Wed, AFRO-AM. (Balt.), Mar. 10, 1942, at 1, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapersnid=UBnQDr5gPskC&dat=l 94203 10& printsec=frontpage.
19. Gov. Fails to Answer Pleafor Hearing,AFRO-AM. (Balt.), Mar. 17, 1942, at 1, available
at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=UBnQDr5gPskC&dat- 19420317&printsec=front
page.
20. Officer Bender Killed Man in 1940, AFRO-AM. (Balt.), Feb. 3, 1942, at 2, available at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2211 &dat-19420203&id=EZ41AAAAIBAJ&sjid-4_Q
FAAAAIBAJ&pg=2825,440102.
21. See ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD
105-14, 151-63 (1964) (discussing specific accounts of the CRS and police brutality); see also
JOHN T. ELLIFF, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 19371962, at 159-70 (Harold Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., 1987) (discussing prosecutions directed
against police brutality); RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 111-73
(2007) (discussing contemporary view on the CRS and police brutality cases).
22. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 120 (1947).
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the Justice Department, wrote to an assistant U.S. attorney (AUSA)
in Baltimore, who Rotnem believed had investigated the case.
However, the AUSA replied that Rotnem was mistaken and that the
only investigation had been the one that the committee of the
Governor's commission had conducted. Bernard Flynn, the U.S.
attorney in Baltimore, also wrote to Clark, stating defensively that
''no complaint has ever been filed in this office" and that the
commission report was never forwarded to his office. Flynn noted
the long list of cooperative witnesses but concluded, "I do not
believe successful prosecution could be obtained at this late date."
Clark agreed. 23 He wrote back to Hughes thanking him for the letter
and stating that the Justice Department would not pursue the case.24
No additional investigation was conducted into the incident.
The archival records of the CRS's correspondence with the
public in the early 1940s reveal that CRS attorneys frequently felt
powerless to act despite credible claims that state officials had
perpetrated egregious rights violations. 25 The CRS, which Attorney
General Frank Murphy formed as the Civil Liberties Unit in 1939,
faced significant legal and practical constraints that prevented it from
responding aggressively to most of the cases that were reported to
the unit. 26 As a result, a very large number of rights claimants found
that the federal government was not willing to take any action in
response. 27
The failure of so many people to get help is an example that
supports the fundamental contention of this Article: to understand the
availability of remedies for certain rights violations, it is essential to
look not only at which rights judges have recognized but also at the
institutional context that determines what kinds of remedies are
available for rights violations. Scholars need a clear understanding of
23. Letter from Tom C. Clark, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Bernard J.
Flynn, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Dec. 21, 1943), File 144-35-4 (on file with author).
24. Letter from Tom C. Clark, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to W.A.C.
Hughes, Jr., Attorney at Law (Dec. 22, 1943), File 144-35-4 (on file with author).
25. CARR, supra note 21, at 33-34.
26. Id. at 24, 29-32.
27. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 120 (reporting that
the CRS received between 1500 and 2500 complaints in each of its first eight years of operation
but prosecuted only 178 cases); Lynda G. Dodd, Presidential Leadership and Civil Rights
Lawyering in the Era Before Brown, 85 IND. L.J. 1599, 1637 (2010) ("[T]he report retained the
core criticisms of CRS: insufficient personnel, uncooperative local U.S. Attorneys, and the FBI's
ineffective methods of investigating civil rights cases.").
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the institutional context if they want to identify the kinds of actions
that are needed to improve rights remedies. Convincing judges to
recognize new rights will not automatically enable people to obtain
legal remedies for violations of those rights. For many of the
complainants, the problem was not that they lacked legal rights.
Rather, the problem was that the government lacked the institutional
capacities that are needed to provide meaningful remedies for rights
violations.
Legal sources for rights protections rarely acknowledge the need
for institutional support to vindicate rights. Numerous provisions of
the Constitution express federal guarantees of rights, and express
those guarantees in absolute language that suggests that rights are
always inviolable. 28 However, remedies for violations of those rights
are only practically available if government officials make
discretionary choices to create, empower, and maintain institutions or
offices that can protect rights. As a result, the actual provision of
rights remedies is at all times dependent upon accumulations of
political choices elected officials make. Understanding the processes
through which government officials make those political decisions is
thus an important part of understanding remedies for rights
violations.
At the most fundamental level, the Constitution itself fails to
establish judicial institutions as a forum for enforcing civil remedies
for rights violations. The Constitution does empower Congress to
create federal courts with jurisdiction to hear constitutional cases2 9
but does not force Congress to provide adequate institutional
capacity to protect rights. Civil processes provide the most direct
mechanism for individuals to obtain redress. However, particular
individuals' ability to obtain remedies will depend on elected
officials' choices. These choices include how many and what kinds
of courts to establish, what jurisdiction to give those courts, and how
adequately to staff those courts. At the federal level, the remedies
available to individuals will also depend on Congress's choices
affecting access to the courts and the costs of seeking redress (e.g.,

28. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. II, IV, V.
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
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availability of class-action remedies, rules for awards of legal fees in
civil litigation). 30
The Constitution's original allotment of state and federal
responsibilities broke down with the constitutional failure of the
Civil War. 3 1 After the war, three transformative amendments placed
significant new limits on the powers of state governments, granted
broad new powers to the federal government, and dramatically
expanded the scope of constitutional rights. 32 However, as with the
wording of the original Constitution, the new constitutional text
expressed rights in broad and absolute language while leaving it to
elected officials to develop the institutions needed to make those
guarantees effective. Each amendment ends with a section
empowering Congress to pass legislation to enforce the broad new
guarantees but leaves Congress the choice of what mechanisms to
create to enforce the new rights.
The result, quite often, is a gap between broadly framed
constitutional rights and actual practices and experiences. In the case
at hand, Private Broadus clearly had his constitutional due process
and equal protection rights violated when Officer Bender murdered
him. However, no legal remedy was ever available for those rights
violations. This was true in almost every one of more than eight
hundred instances of reported rights violations from 1939-1941 that
I have examined in the National Archives's CRS correspondence
files. The CRS papers record a monotonous, bureaucratized routine
in which government officials told people who made credible claims
of rights violations that there was nothing their government could do
to help.3

30. Here I am addressing federal-level issues and ignoring the parallel processes that shape
state-level institutional capacities. I am certainly oversimplifying by focusing on the federal level.
However, much of my substantive focus in what follows is on cases where state officials violated
rights that are protected by the federal constitution, cases where the targets of rights violations did
not have meaningful remedies available in state law.
31. See generally MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (1988) (arguing that the Constitution failed both (1) because it denied

slaves and free blacks the means to participate in political life and (2) because it could not
reconcile the increasingly divergent constitutional cultures of the North and the South).
32. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII,

§ 2; XIV, §§

1, 5; XV,

§ 2;

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF

RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163-214 (1998).

33. See, e.g., Letter from Wendell Berge, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to Florence
Brown (Jan. 10, 1941), File 144-35 (on file with author); Letter from Brien McMahon, Assistant
Attorney Gen., to Pearl Squires Olsen (Mar. 21, 1939), File 144-0 (on file with author).
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It is, of course, not headline news to point out that remedies for
rights violations depend on institutional capacities and that
institutional capacities in turn depend on elected officials' choices.
However, looking at the experience of the early CRS provides an
opportunity for a clarifying examination of the political processes
underlying the availability of American rights protections. Studying
the CRS provides an opportunity to illuminate early stages in the
development of today's institutional system for protecting rights. In
the decades since the CRS was formed, elected officials have
dramatically expanded federal capacities to protect rights. The tiny
CRS has expanded and become the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Division." Elected officials have also created civil rights
offices within many existing federal agencies and created several
new regulatory agencies dedicated to protecting rights.36 There is a
large body of statutory law protecting rights against racial and other
forms of discrimination in employment, housing, and education. "
In contrast, at the time of the CRS founding in 1939, there was
almost no federal civil rights law and no federal institutional capacity
to protect rights. 3 The CRS program of prosecutions in rights cases
was based on a few scattered Reconstruction-era provisions in the
criminal code that had lain largely dormant for decades. 39 The CRS
attempted to revive those provisions in a handful of test prosecutions,
but the few existing statutes had narrow scope and numerous
technical limitations that made them impossible to deploy in a wide

34. BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2, 8-13 (1997).

35. See generally id at 29-30 (discussing legislative and judicial concerns that led to the
development of the Civil Rights Division).
36. See Civil Rights Division, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/ (last
updated Nov. 16, 2010); Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2010); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2010); see also Civil Rights, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/civilrights/civilrts.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2010);
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/ocr/
index.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010); Office of Civil Rights, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/aboutlofficeorg/headquarters offices/acr/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
37. E.g., Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
(2006); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
38. CARR, supra note 21, at 56-57, 121.
39. Id. at 56-84.
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variety of cases.4 Nevertheless, the CRS hoped to use test cases to
get appellate court rulings upholding the largely untested statutes.
The CRS also hoped to prompt appellate court judges to relax
existing constitutional doctrines that limited the reach of federal
power over rights cases, particularly the state action doctrine. "
Of course, the most direct path to expanding federal power
would have been for Congress to pass new, more comprehensive
civil rights laws. The CRS turned to a test-case legal strategy only
because political conditions made it impossible to pass new civil
rights laws at that time.4 2 Southern Democrats used the Senate
filibuster and other obstructionist tactics to block all proposals for
civil rights legislation.4 3 The CRS thus turned to what is now the
most familiar method for expanding remedies for rights: bringing
litigation designed to elicit appellate court rulings that would create
or enable the use of novel rights remedies.
The CRS litigation campaign yielded mixed results. The CRS
did have substantial success using a federal anti-peonage law to go
after some egregious labor conditions in the South.4" On issues other
than peonage, the CRS had thinner statutory resources and faced
more complicated constitutional obstacles. One CRS prosecution did
result in a landmark Supreme Court ruling in United States v.
Classic.4 5 In that case, the Court allowed federal power to reach a
state primary election-an important precursor to the Court's ruling
against white primaries in Smith v. Allwright.4 6 Nevertheless, the
CRS had largely abandoned its litigation approach by the end of the
decade. The CRS's litigation strategy did not generate appellate court
rulings indicating unambiguously that the Court would support a
more aggressive or comprehensive federal approach to rights
protection under existing laws. As a result, the CRS was able to
40. Id. at 58-61, 69-77; PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 115-20.
41. CARR, supra note 21, at 49-55; PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22,
at 132-33.
42. See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE WAY FOR BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 97-143 (2004); ROBERT L.
ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980).

43. ELLIFF, supra note 21, at 68; ZANGRANDO, supra note 42, at 128, 149-53.
44. CARR, supra note 21, at 116-20, 180-82; GOLUBOFF, supra note 21, at 113-15, 124-29,
241-42.

45. 314 U.S. 707 (1941).
46. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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prosecute only a very small percentage of the cases that were brought
to its attention.
My goal in this Article is not to explain the failure of the CRS's
litigation campaign by probing the reasons the CRS failed to win
more favorable rulings from judges. I do not attempt any serious
analysis of the strength of the doctrinal arguments made by the CRS
or the judges. Nor do I try to explain the judges' rulings through the
political-science approach of focusing on judges' ideology or policy
views.47 The goal is instead to think about the CRS's appellatelitigation strategy's less-direct consequences by thinking about
alternative roads not taken. In particular, I want to ask how choosing
a legalistic strategy centered on lawyers and appellate advocacy
locked the CRS into a particular approach to the underlying politics
of federal rights remedies.
I consider two interwoven elements of the CRS campaign: the
core effort to bring test cases to prompt favorable changes in
appellate doctrines, and the parallel effort to inform and
communicate with the public while gathering usable information
from the public's response to the program.
The analysis builds on the large body of socio-legal scholarship
regarding litigation campaigns-scholarship that has focused almost
exclusively on campaigns by interest groups rather than campaigns
by government attorneys. 48 Since the NAACP's dramatic legal
victory in Brown v. Boardof Education4 ignited scholarly interest in
interest group litigation campaigns, scholars have debated whether
such campaigns are effective strategies for producing social change.
Those debates have generated constructive thinking about the
effectiveness of litigation-based strategies and the relationship
between litigation and more conventional forms of political
participation. Both positivist political scientists"o and legal
47. Such an approach would not likely be very helpful or convincing. Judges cast some
surprising votes in CRS cases. For example, Frank Murphy, who created the CRS while Attorney
General, joined a dissenting opinion in Classic that implied that the entire CRS program of
reviving Reconstruction-Era laws unconstitutional. Judges were also not entirely consistent across
cases. Murphy, Black and Douglas voted against the CRS in Classic, but with the CRS in Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944). Frankfurter and Roberts switched in the other direction.
48. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,

AND POLITICAL CHANGE xvii-xlvii (2004); Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements:
Contemporary Perspectives,2 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 17, 17-20, 24-29 (2006).

49.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

50. See, e.g., GERALDN. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2008).
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academics 5" have argued that because courts lack the institutional
power to produce lasting social change on their own, interest groups
should abandon litigation-based strategies in favor of conventional
political mobilization aimed at the other more powerful branches of
government. In response, socio-legal scholars have rejected the
critics' sharp dichotomy between litigation and ordinary politics.
Michael W. McCann, for example, showed that litigation should not
be seen as an alternative to direct political action, but instead as a
means of facilitating such action.52 Litigation can help political
movements by publicizing grievances, mobilizing participants, and
changing people's ideas about what is possible and just. Recognizing
these less-direct benefits of litigation means that litigation campaigns
cannot be evaluated solely by looking to policy changes that directly
stem from court rulings. Even when groups lose in court, their efforts
to litigate can help to change the underlying politics. Group litigation
efforts build support and solidarity among advocates and change
public attitudes more generally.
While subsequent studies of interest groups and related
movements for social change have confirmed McCann's insights
about the less-direct effects of litigation,53 there has not been as
much consideration of how the model might apply to litigation
campaigns conducted by the government. On the surface, the CRS
case seems to share some features of more celebrated instances of
interest-group litigation. Like the NAACP's prototypical campaign
against segregation, the CRS campaign involved a coordinated
sequence of test cases designed to lead the Supreme Court to
incrementally shift constitutional doctrines. However, my study of
the CRS activity shows that the connections between litigation and
politics can be more complicated when government attorneys are
involved. The CRS's focus on litigation led government attorneys
working on civil rights issues to turn away from opportunities to (1)
51.

See, e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT 19-26 (1993).

52.

MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK (1994).

53. E.g., ELLEN ANN ANDERSON, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS (2005);
RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2007); HELENA
SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW MEANING AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

(1996); Anna M. Marshall, Injustice Frames, Legality, and the Everyday Construction of Sexual
Harassment, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 659, 659-90 (2003); Francesca Polletta, The Structural
Context ofNovel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing,1961-1966, 34 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 367 (2000).
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use the CRS program to build political support for civil rights and (2)
engage mobilized members of the public in their campaign for rights.
The CRS case study suggests that insider strategies like governmentled litigation are unlikely to build political foundations for expanded
rights protections.
My conclusions about government litigation campaigns, based
on a single case, are tentative. My limited goal here is primarily to
frame some questions about such strategies (e.g., questions about
whether government litigation campaigns have the same strengths
and weaknesses as interest-group litigation campaigns and how the
success of such campaigns, relative to alternative strategies, might be
assessed).
In the next part, I provide a broad overview of the legal issues at
stake in the prosecutions brought by the CRS and of the federal
courts' reaction to their efforts. In Part III, I look at the CRS's
response to the many thousands of civil rights complaints sent to the
CRS in the decade after it was created. In conclusion, Part IV looks
at the implications.

II. THE LEGAL TRACK
As noted above, the biggest obstacle to effective federal
protection of rights was political, not legal: Congress was unwilling
to pass effective civil rights laws. Unable to surmount that obstacle,
the CRS turned to existing federal law. CRS lawyers identified three
federal code provisions that might be used to conduct prosecutions in
cases involving rights violations. All three had been passed during
Reconstruction and had survived various waves of legislative repeal
and judicial attacks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries that had removed most Reconstruction civil rights laws
from the statute books.
The most effective of the three was a federal anti-peonage
statute (42 U.S.C. § 1994). 54 Because of the federal government's
broader powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, the statute was on
relatively firm constitutional footing. However, its application was
limited to peonage cases, and it could not be used to go after other
rights violations. Each of the other two provisions (42 U.S.C. §§ 5154.
(2006).

CARR,

supra note 21, at 83. The Anti-Peonage Act is codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 1994
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52, now §§ 241-242) covered a broader scope of rights. Section 51
provided protection for "any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States," and § 52 for "any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured ... by the Constitution and laws of
the United States."5 However, those two provisions were limited in
other ways that made the CRS uncertain about how effectively they
could be deployed."
Section 51 applied only to conspiracies to deprive rights and
thus could not be used to go after solo perpetrators. Section 52 did
not require a conspiracy but only applied to a perpetrator who had
been acting "under color of law" to "willfully" violate rights. " The
courts had not given a definitive gloss to either of those two
qualifiers. More generally, neither § 51 nor § 52 had been used very
often, and the CRS was thus uncertain about how the appellate courts
would construe some key provisions and whether the courts would
find constitutional problems with the CRS attempt to bring novel
prosecutions using those provisions. The CRS expected defendants
to raise constitutional objections to prosecutions under the two
provisions. The disuse of the statute, and legal uncertainty about
precisely what rights were protected by the "Constitution and laws of
the United States," would lead to due process objections on grounds
of uncertainty about the criminal statute's meaning. 59 As importantly,
the Supreme Court's state action doctrine was understood to limit
federal power to cases where state actors violated rights.6 0 This
doctrine created uncertainty about the reach of federal power in some
categories of cases that interested the CRS. For example, in lynching
cases, state officials (like jailers and police officers) often acted as
55.

CARR, supra note 21, at 57-60.

56. Id at 56-85; PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 116-17.

57.
58.
59.
60.
Pamela

CARR, supra note 21, at 74-75.
Id. at 56-84.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 41-42, 47-49. 1 include the "was understood" qualifier because I am convinced by
Brandwein's argument that the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 did not, in fact, establish

anything like the state action doctrine as it is understood today. Brandwein does agree that the
CRS accepted the now-standard reading of the Civil Rights cases. Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial
Abandonment of Blacks? Rethinking the "State Action" Cases of the Waite Court, 41 LAW &

SoC'Y REV. 343, 376-79 (2007). I also agree with the arguments of Amar, Jack M. Balkin, and
others that the state action doctrine is wrong as a matter of constitutional text and history. AMAR,
supra note 32, at 163-74; Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801

(2010).
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bystanders rather than as direct participants. CRS attorneys wrote
law review articles arguing that the inaction of state officials in
lynching cases could be considered a form of state action."' There
were also ambiguities in cases that involved more direct involvement
of state actors. For example, in some of the CRS's police-brutality
cases, local law-enforcement officers removed their badges or used
their private automobiles while perpetrating rights violations, in an
apparent effort to dissociate themselves from their official roles. 62
The CRS was uncertain how far courts would allow federal power to
reach in such cases. There was some hope that judges would accept
the CRS's argument that the "color of law" phrase in § 52 could
apply to state officials acting outside their official capacities, but
CRS attorneys were not certain that judges would accept that novel
claim. 63
While the CRS understood the difficulties with the existing
statutes, the Congressional impasse left few alternatives. CRS
attorneys thus decided to conduct a small number of test prosecutions
under the existing federal statutes. While such prosecutions could be
a modest way of forcing at least some criminals to face justice, CRS
records make it clear that CRS officials never expected the existing
federal laws to support a comprehensive federal program for federal
rights protections. They hoped, however, that the test cases could
be a catalyst for subsequent improvements in rights protections by
obtaining helpful judicial declarations about the reach of federal
power. In particular, the prosecutions could test whether the Supreme
Court remained committed to doctrines that limited the reach of
federal power under the Civil War amendments. Those doctrines had
become encrusted and accepted at a time when there was little
remaining political support for expanding federal power.
In the aftermath of the New Deal constitutional crisis, the CRS
was hopeful that judges-particularly Supreme Court judges-would
61. Frank Coleman, Freedom from Fearon the Home Front, 29 IOWA L. REV. 415, 415-29
(1944); Victor W. Rotnem, Clarifications of the Civil Rights' Statutes, 2 BILL RTS. REV. 252,
259-61 (1942); Victor W. Rotnem, The Federal Civil Right "Not to Be Lynched, " 28 WASH. U.
L. Q. 57, 57-73 (1943).
62. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944).
63. CARR, supra note 21, at 72; ELLIFF, supra note 21, at 147-48.
64. Letter from Frank Murphy to Antonio Bautista, President, Civil Liberties Union of the
Phil. (Apr. 6, 1939), File 144-0 (on file with author); Letter from Frank Murphy to Senator
Edward Burke (May 4, 1939), File 144-0 (on file with author).
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be less inclined to obstruct attempted expansions of federal power
and, thus, more likely to back away from the most restrictive
versions of the state action doctrine. Even a small number of
prosecutions under the flawed Reconstruction statutes might
eventually have a broader impact by confirming that the Supreme
Court was no longer an obstacle to congressional action expanding
federal rights protections. That possibility meant that successful test
cases could have an important political dimension. Members of
Congress who obstructed efforts to pass civil rights statutes could
claim that such statutes would unconstitutionally interfere with state
police powers. However, if CRS test cases led the Supreme Court to
articulate a broadened vision of federal remedial powers, opponents
of civil rights reform would lose a powerful rhetorical weapon.
Despite the CRS's broad ambitions, the program ended up being
quite modest because of a variety of factors. One important
institutional factor was the CRS's location in the Justice
Department's Criminal Division. Therefore, the CRS was staffed by
lawyers trained as prosecutors, who in turn worked with locally
based federal prosecutors working for U.S. attorneys. That meant
that CRS attorneys would be evaluated based on their ability to win
cases (i.e., to get juries to convict defendants and to have those
convictions sustained by appellate courts). 65 The case of Private
Broadus makes it clear that federal prosecutors became reluctant to
take on even egregious cases if they were not confident of getting a
conviction.6 6 Prosecutorial reluctance was undoubtedly reinforced
when juries in the Deep South failed to convict defendants in some
racially charged cases. " Biased juries did not necessarily thwart the
appellate advocacy component of the CRS program. The early CRS
expected that demurrers to indictments could lead to appellate court
rulings on the constitutionality of indictments even before cases went
to juries. 68 However, prosecutors tasked with actually building cases
and arguing them before juries were likely to remain interested in
65. President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights concluded that the orientation around
criminal law was one of the key limitations of the CRS program. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 125-33, 151-53.

66. Letter from Bernard Flynn, U.S. Attorney, Balt., to Tom C. Clark, Assistant Attorney
Gen. (Dec. 16, 1943), File 144-35-4 (on file with author).
67. CARR, supra note 21, at 138-42.
68. Id. at 136-38.
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winning cases and thus unenthusiastic about flawed cases or cases
unlikely to be winnable in troubled locales. There are, for example,
instances where U.S. attorneys responded to requests to investigate
cases by telling the D.C. office that the victim in a case had a bad
reputation or an unrelated criminal record. 6
These moderating tendencies were reinforced by the strategy of
advancing civil rights protections through appellate advocacy rather
than by passing new statutes. From the beginning, it was clear that
the CRS could only investigate and prosecute a small percentage of
the cases brought to its attention. One result was that the CRS could
be quite selective in searching for test cases. The CRS could ignore
problematic cases and select ones that made it relatively easy to
frame issues effectively in order to persuade reluctant judges to go
along with expansions in federal power. The CRS wanted to find
particularly egregious violations in order to present the need for
federal intervention in a particularly strong light. " The CRS's early
test cases before Supreme Court thus sidestepped some of the more
volatile political issues related to civil rights violations. UnitedStates
v. Classic,"' which convinced the Supreme Court to allow federal
power to reach a state primary election, involved a rigged vote count
rather than the more pervasive issue of racial exclusions from
voting.72
The modest scope of the program was further reinforced because
the CRS wanted to be able to reassure appellate judges that the
federal government was not being too aggressive in expanding its
turf. CRS attorneys were appropriately worried that judges might
object if they felt that federal attention to rights cases was expanding
too quickly and without congressional authorization. They also
worried that judges might be concerned about federal interference
with state government responsibilities. In key test cases, the CRS
tried to reassure the Supreme Court that it was keeping the total
number of prosecutions quite small. The CRS also informed the
Court that it had a policy of dropping cases if state governments
69. ELLIFF, supra note 21, at 160-62.
70. GOLUBOFF, supra note 21, 127-28 ("For the development of new civil rights
understandings, the CRS tried to prosecute especially shocking abuses, like peonage and
involuntary servitude, lynching, and police brutality.").
71. 314U.S.707(1941)
72. United States v. Classic, 314 U.S. 707 (1941); CARR, supra note 21, at 85-86.
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could be convinced to conduct their own investigations. " One result
of that policy was that states could shield themselves from federal
scrutiny by prolonging their own inadequate investigations, as
Maryland did in the Private Broadus case.
The CRS program's modest scope made it difficult for the CRS
to make much of a dent in problems related to civil rights. As noted
above, the CRS did have some real success using peonage
prosecutions to combat some of the worst labor practices in the
South.74 (This success was possible because the federal anti-peonage
statute was more effectively drafted, and because federal power was
on firmer constitutional footing in going after near-slavery
conditions.) The CRS also made some noble efforts to stem a wave
of attacks on Jehovah's Witnesses, winning a notable circuit court
ruling upholding the conviction of West Virginia officials who
participated in a horrendous vigilante attack."
Ultimately, however, the CRS's attempts to prompt courts to
relax doctrinal limits on federal power were not very successful.
Even when the CRS won favorable appellate rulings, judges tended
to write opinions that avoided the core constitutional questions
regarding federal power. At the Supreme Court level, the CRS was
frustrated by the justices' unwillingness to stake out clear and
consistent positions that could guide future prosecutions under
existing law or clarify the reach of federal power under prospective
laws. Astonishingly, five justices flipped sides between Classic and
the CRS's next important Supreme Court test prosecution, the 1944
case Screws v. United States."6 In Screws, federal prosecutors had
(miraculously) convinced an all-white Georgia jury to convict a
sheriff who had led a drunken posse that clubbed an AfricanAmerican man to death on a town square. n The Supreme Court
73. The Justice Department's brief in Screws v. United States included information about
department policies designed to limit interference with state investigations and emphasized that
the federal government consequently pursued very few cases. Brief for Petitioners at 49-52,
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944) (No. 42); see also Screws, 325 U.S. at 155-61
(Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson, JJ., dissenting). Of course, goals related to appellate advocacy
were not the only reason the CRS program was modest. The unit had very few resources to work
with. For more information, see the discussion in the next part, infra.
74. CARR, supra note 21, at 180-82.
75. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
76. 325 U.S. 91 (1944).
77. Id. at 93-94; David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of
Fictional Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 27-52
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vacated the conviction. 7 ' The badly divided Court could not produce
an opinion of the Court, and Justice Rutledge wrote a remarkable
separate opinion explaining that his decisive vote to overturn the
conviction was insincere and that he had cast it only to dispose of the
case. 7 Such rulings no doubt devastated CRS attorneys. In Screws,
the Supreme Court's plurality opinion focused on a supposed flaw in
the jury instructions-a flaw to which the appellant himself had
never objected."o A second jury later acquitted Sheriff Screws, and
he went on to serve in the state legislature. 81 Frustrated by such
failures, the CRS gradually abandoned its project of using existing
federal laws as a tool for expanding rights protections over the next
few years.
III. THE POLITICAL TRACK
As noted in the Introduction, my goal in this Article is not to
explain why the CRS campaign failed to produce appellate rulings
that were more favorable to the CRS. Instead this Article explores
how the CRS litigation efforts were connected to broader political
processes that CRS attorneys themselves saw as essential to the
development of effective federal remedies for rights violations. I
want to ask whether government-led litigation becomes integrated in
surrounding political processes in a way that is different from the
way interest-group litigation campaigns become catalysts for broader
political change. In this case, the attorneys working for the CRS
seemed to understand that constitutional litigation by itself was
unlikely to lead to major changes in policies and practices on the
ground.82 Real change requires broader institutional developments
that make remedies widely available. Such developments include

(1999) (including a detailed account, based on trial transcripts, of the circumstances leading to
Screws's attack on Robert Hall).
78. Screws, 325 U.S. at 112-13.
79. Id. at 113-34.

80. The jury instruction issue was sua sponte. Id. at 107, 118.
81. LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 285-86 (1966).
82. The CRS attorneys were working a generation before the Warren Court's landmark civil
rights and criminal justice rulings transformed understandings of the Supreme Court. They did
not seem to buy into the "hollow hope" that the Supreme Court can produce social change
without support from other branches of government. ROSENBERG, supra note 50, at 21-36
(leading scholarly effort to debunk the "hollow hope").
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financial inducements through grant programs, creation of
enforcement bureaucracies empowered to provide corrective
remedies, and creation of a civil cause of action, along with tools for
making civil remedies available and affordable (class actions, awards
of attorney's fees, etc.).
Those broader institutional changes
typically occur only after sustained political pressure leads elected
officials-and not just judges-to act. Scholars have noted that
interest-group litigation can be an important tool for building
political movements that can support such broader changes.84
However, it is not clear whether government-led litigation can be
leveraged in the same way.
In the CRS's case, politics was imbricated with the litigation
strategy in at least two significant ways. First, the complicated racial
politics of the era often made it quite difficult for the CRS to secure
resources and logistical support needed to combat rights violations.
The Roosevelt coalition depended on the support of two
fundamentally opposed constituencies: African Americans (and
sympathetic white liberals) in northern swing districts and the whitesupremacist southern wing of the Democratic Party. A delicate
political dance resulted from the need to maintain the support of
these two key groups. The administration could occasionally make
modest gestures in support of racial justice, including the decision to
create the CRS. " However, the administration always had to
accompany such efforts with credible reassurances that the policies
would not disrupt the racial caste system in the South. This political
dance shaped CRS litigation in important ways. The CRS tried to
find test cases that did not directly confront the thorniest issues of
race, particularly in its early test cases. "
83. See Sarah Staszak, The Politics of Judicial Retrenchment (Feb. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Brandeis University) (discussing the importance of structural factors and the
underlying politics that shape them).
84. See MCCANN, supra note 52, at 48.
85. I do not mean to suggest that Frank Murphy created the CRS purely or even primarily as
a symbolic political gesture. Nothing in the records suggests that Murphy was not sincere or that
the Roosevelt administration tried to use the CRS to please some African American constituency.
86. Supra note 72 and accompanying text. One indication that the CRS wanted to avoid the
White Primary is that the Justice Department did not file an amicus brief in Smith v. Allwright.
The President's Committee on Civil Rights was very critical of the department's policy on amicus
briefs in civil rights cases. See Dodd, supra note 27, at 1638-39. The CRS also searched for
lynching cases with white victims or cases from outside the South. CARR, supra note 21, at 172;
ELLIFF, supra note 21, at 147-48.
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The underlying politics also affected the CRS's day-to-day
operations. Most fundamentally, the Roosevelt administration proved
unwilling to devote sufficient resources to the CRS's effort. Fewer
than eight attorneys staffed the office. CRS staff was based in
Washington, D.C. and thus depended on the FBI or on local U.S.
attorneys to obtain information and conduct investigations. Studies
of the early CRS all find that the CRS sometimes lost interest in
cases because the federal officials in the field were reluctant to
cooperate."
The 1940 case of United States v. Sutherland" illustrates some

of the problems caused by the organizational decisions regarding
cooperation between the CRS, the FBI, and the rest of the Justice
Department. The case involved the Atlanta Police Department's
torture of Quintar South, an African American man accused of theft.
The FBI resisted an early CRS request to investigate the police force,
fearing that such an investigation would damage the FBI's relations
with the Atlanta police. Assistant Attorney General Matthew
McGuire blocked the CRS's efforts to force the FBI to conduct the
investigation, and the case eventually closed without a conviction."
Stronger political support from the White House or from political
appointees in the Justice Department might have made it easier to
secure cooperation in such cases, but the CRS rarely received such
support.
The effect of politics on the ability of the CRS to secure
resources and logistical support was not the only way in which
politics was part of the CRS programs. A second political dimension
of the CRS program concerns people outside of the government
rather than competing political factions within the government. The
CRS program was occasionally linked to efforts to build outside
political support for rights and rights protections. The CRS sought to
publicize its interest in civil rights, to enlist the general public in its
efforts to combat rights violations, and to use the public's response to
87. CARR, supra note 21, 152-54; PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22,

120-22, 122-25 (discussing problems getting cooperation from U.S. Attorneys and problems
with the FBI).
88. 37 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
89. ELLIFF, supra note 21, at 109-11; see also CARR, supra note 21, at 105-08. Despite the

failure to obtain a conviction, the U.S. attorney in Atlanta reported back to the CRS that he
thought the case had a positive effect on the policies of the Atlanta police. CARR, supra note 21,
at 154.
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its program to demonstrate that civil rights was a major issue that
deserved a federal response. CRS attorneys traveled to speak to local
bar associations about their program and wrote law review articles
about their doctrinal arguments. The CRS also made efforts to
publicize its program to the general public. Many of the letters the
CRS processed mentioned a nationally broadcast radio address on
civil liberties that Frank Murphy gave in 1939.90 Several letters also
mentioned stories that appeared in local papers after CRS attorneys
visited with different attorneys' groups outside of Washington. As
part of these outreach efforts, the CRS asked private attorneys and
members of the public to bring civil rights problems to the Justice
Department's attention. As a result, the CRS received a large volume
of correspondence from members of the public seeking redress for
rights violations.91 The CRS was also tasked with responding to all
rights-related mail sent to other executive branch offices and
agencies. The CRS thus processed many letters that individual
citizens had sent to President Roosevelt or Eleanor Roosevelt. 92
The large volume of mail regarding rights violations became a
source of support for the political cause of expanded rights
protections. CRS officials often noted the large volume of complaints
to support their political argument that the country had significant
rights-related problems that required expanded federal remedies.
President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights also reported on the
large number of civil rights complaints in 1947.93 Ironically,
however, the CRS rejected nearly all of the complaint letters as
unworthy of the department's attention.

90. See, e.g., Letter from Emily C. Brunner to Frank Murphy, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice (Mar. 29, 1939), File 144-0 (on file with author).

91. It is difficult to determine the precise number of letters processed by the CRS. My
research has looked at letters from 1939-1941 that are preserved in the Justice Department's
general correspondence files. Those files do not yield an accurate count because it is clear that
there are many letters missing from the archived correspondence files. Contemporaneous claims
about the number of letters vary widely. The attorney general published figures on the number of
letters handled by the CRS for 1942 (8,612) and 1943 (13,490), and Robert Carr estimated that
about 20,000 letters were processed in 1944. CARR, supra note 21, at 125. The President's
Committee on Civil Rights reported in 1947 that the CRS processed between 1,500 and 2,500
civil rights "complaints" per year between 1939 and 1947, but the report is not clear about how
"complaints" were distinguished from other correspondence. Id.
92. See, e.g., Letter from Veronica McCormick to Eleanor Roosevelt, First Lady (Apr. 9,
1941), File 144-12-0 (on file with author).
93. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 120.
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For a separate book project, I have conducted a study using a
sample of 1,100 letters that the CRS processed, primarily from 1939
to 1941. The study also looked at the CRS's replies. In the sample of
letters, 879 people wrote to the federal government to express
concerns related to civil rights or civil liberties. Of the 879 cases, 710
involve complaints or requests for help regarding particular incidents
of rights violations. In nearly every case, the CRS refused to help.9
The pattern in the letters reveals that, unlike the attorneys for more
familiar interest-group litigation campaigns, CRS attorneys failed to
link their legal strategies to any broader efforts at political
mobilization. Few letter writers received anything in reply other than
a short letter acknowledging the complaint and stating that the
department could not help." The department's refusals to help were
understandable given resource limitations. However, the CRS's
methods of explaining its refusals to help can be interesting and
illuminating because the replies collectively reveal the department's
attitude toward political engagement.
For this Article, I provide only a few examples as illustrations.
A series of letters from Veronica McCormick to Eleanor Roosevelt
provides a good example of the letter writers' difficulties with trying
to find remedies for rights violations. 96 McCormick reported that her
brother had his leg amputated because he had developed an infection
after he was badly beaten by Los Angeles police officers. 97 She
movingly invoked broad ideals of "justice" and described the related
need to hold officials accountable for the injuries they had caused her
brother. 98 She reported, however, that she was having a difficult time
obtaining an effective remedy through local government. 99 She said
that the local and state officials "all say their hands are tied" and
would not provide her any help. ' She reported that she was also
having trouble finding a lawyer willing to help and expressed hope

94. See, e.g., Letter from 0. John Rogge to Alvina Douglas (Mar. 12, 1940), File 144-37-0
(on file with author).
95. Id.
96. E.g., Letter from Veronica McCormick to Eleanor Roosevelt, supra note 92.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id
100. Id.
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that Eleanor Roosevelt might help her find a lawyer. 10' In one of her
final letters, McCormick reported that she had obtained a lawyer who
had tried to file suit against the city, but the suit had been thrown out
because the judge ruled that the city could not be held liable for its
police officers' actions. McCormick said that she simply could not
believe that the city had been shielded from liability and expressed
frustration about the difficulty of recovering damages from the
individual officers.
Like most of the people who wrote to the CRS to complain
about specific incidents, McCormick made a variety of different
claims to support her position. She used legal language to make
claims about possible remedies and expressed general ideals about
justice. She combined such claims with non-legal claims showing
that she understood that the federal response to her plea would
depend not only on law but also on government officials'
discretionary choices. 102 Like most letter writers, McCormick
included information and pleas designed to convince government
officials that her case was worthy of their attention and support. 103
She noted that her brother was unable to work because he was now a
"cripple" and that his condition had complicated because he had
developed asthma. 1" The situation, she wrote, was "all so awful and
sad." o' She also included a variety of flattering claims about
Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and professed her political support
of the administration. 106 Such claims were not effective. The CRS's
April 16, 1941, reply told McCormick: "[T]he remedy by way of
damages which you apparently desire must be handled through
private counsel." 107
Most of the complaints that the CRS processed were not about
issues like police brutality, lynchings, or racial violence. Only
101. Id.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The reply did add a line that was more encouraging than most of the CRS's replies. The
letter said that she could contact the U.S. attorney in Los Angeles with more information if she
felt there had been a "violation of some federal criminal statute." Letter from Wendell Berge,
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Veronica McCormick (Apr. 16, 1941), File 14412-0 (on file with author).
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8 percent of the letters made any reference to race at all. Writers
instead expressed a wide variety of concerns that they imaginatively
connected to the CRS's rights-protecting mission. For example,
writers complained that seasonal lettuce pickers were forced to
register their vehicles in California, claimed that an ex-wife had
stolen some movie scripts that social workers later sold to
Hollywood studios, and argued that a zoning decision by the village
homeowners' association board violated a constitutional "right to
earn our own living selling just good food, ice cream, and pop." 108
Letter writers also asserted other offbeat-and sometimes quite
specific-rights. Henry Kost claimed a right to paint signs for a
living and draw cartoons as part of his constitutional protection for
the right to pursue happiness. ' Richard Terry claimed that
Americans had "the right to do your bit of work, to keep from being
a burden, a chisler, a liar upon self and other neighbors." 11o A nurse
named Eleanor Watjus claimed that her work supervisor had violated
her "civil rights as a citizen by taking the liberty to publicly suspend
and put [her] on probation for what Mrs. Messner should have been
blamed for." '"

The CRS replied to most of the people who wrote letters.
Almost all of the reply letters followed the same boilerplate
structure. The replies begin with a short paragraph acknowledging
the letter and attempting to restate the subject of the complaint. The
replies then assert that the department could not help because the
matter fell outside the department's statutory or constitutional
jurisdiction. A typical example of the CRS strategy is the reply sent
to Pearl Squires Olsen, who wrote from Manistique, Michigan, to
complain about corruption on a local school board. The CRS reply
letter noted: "From the information contained in your letter, there is
nothing that would indicate that the matters complained of are not
108. Letter from S.D. Brewton to Attorney General (Sept. 9, 1940), File 144-11-0 (on file
with author); Letter from Milton Kennedy to Franklin Roosevelt (Mar. 6, 1939), File 144-0 (on
file with author); Letter from Hattie Mae Smith to Franklin Roosevelt (July 18, 1940), File 14423-0 (on file with author).
109. Letter from Henry N. Kost to Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice (Nov. 30, 1941), File 144-18-0 (on file with author).
110. Letter from Richard Terry to Robert Jackson (May 20, 1940), File 144-12-0 (on file with
author).
111. Letter from Eleanor Watjus to Franklin Roosevelt (Feb. 10, 1941), File 144-23-0 (on file
with author).
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purely local. In these circumstances, the Department of Justice would
have no jurisdiction to intervene." 11 Another example is the reply
sent to George Ruzicka, who wrote from Sayville, New York, to ask
whether his employer could force him to work against his will under
an employment contract. The CRS replied: "From the facts set forth
in your letter, the remedy open to you for the protection of your
rights lies in the courts of your state. There is nothing under these
circumstances which would permit the federal government to
intervene."

1"

In a few cases, the coldness of the jurisdictional claim was
tempered with expressions of regret that the department could not do
more. When Florence Brown wrote from Baltimore to complain of
her husband's criminal conviction, the CRS replied: "This
Department would like to be of service to you but the matter you
complain of appears to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
State of Maryland."114 After telling Alvina Douglas of Ann Arbor,
Michigan, that it could not help to reverse her daughter's murder
conviction, the department noted: "It is well understood that the
cause for which you plead is a matter of deep concern to you, and it
is with regret that you cannot be favored with a more encouraging
reply." "' However, such expressions of empathy were the exception
rather than the rule.
In other cases, crossed signals or bureaucratic mistakes resulted
in replies that must have been particularly disappointing or even
distressing to letter writers. Emily Brunner wrote to Frank Murphy
after hearing Murphy's radio address about his interest in civil rights
cases. "' Brunner said the speech prompted her complaint about a
veterinarian in Springfield, New Jersey. "' She claimed that her dog
had died of rabies from a botched vaccination, leaving her family
with large medical bills for rabies treatments. " In response, the
112. Letter from Brien McMahon, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Pearl
Squires Olsen (Mar. 21, 1939), File 144-0 (on file with author).
113. Letter from Brien McMahon, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to George F.
Ruzicka (Apr. 28, 1939), File 144-0 (on file with author).
114. Letter from Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Florence
Brown (Jan. 10, 1941), File 144-35 (on file with author).
115. Letter from 0. John Rogge to Alvina Douglas, supra note 94.
116. Letter from Emily C. Brunner to Frank Murphy, supra note 90.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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department sent a brief reply letter that merely acknowledged "with
appreciation" her interest in Murphy's radio address. "' The reply
letter failed to even mention the complaint about her dog. 120
Such snafus were rare. More often, the CRS correspondence
captured routine bureaucratic exchanges between concerned citizens
and government officials with limited resources for providing
requested help. However, these routine exchanges have a political
dimension that should inform any evaluation of this part of the CRS
program. Individual petitions to the government are an essential form
of political participation in a democratic society-and, in fact, the
only form of political participation given explicit protection in the
original Constitution. 121 The people who wrote to the CRS were
motivated and engaged enough to press demands on government
officials. Letter writers often articulated constitutional grounds for
the federal government to take a more active role protecting rights,
particularly when incidents involved corrupt local officials who were
unlikely to be controlled by local governments. Such claims reveal
that the letter writers were allies who shared many of the CRS's
broader political and constitutional goals. Nevertheless, the CRS's
reply letters invariably read as attempts to defuse and depoliticize
adversarial encounters with citizens. The boilerplate reply letters
used depersonalized legal rhetoric about the department's
jurisdiction, claiming that it was impossible for the federal
government to provide assistance with "purely local" difficulties.
The CRS made jurisdiction claims without providing
information that would help people understand the limits on federal
jurisdiction. Replies stating categorically that the department could
do "nothing" under "these circumstances" provided little help to
writers who wanted to understand what alternative circumstances
might allow the government to help. In many cases, better-informed
writers could have re-framed complaints to establish a basis for
federal intervention, perhaps by providing more information about
the complicity of state officials in the reported wrongs. The CRS's
routine use of jurisdictional claims is also somewhat surprising

119. Letter from Brien McMahon to Emily C. Brunner (Apr. 13, 1939), File 144-0 (on file
with author).
120. Id.

121. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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because more than half of the complaints were about state or federal
officials and thus-in theory at least-within the reach of federal
power under the state action doctrine. In addition, the CRS expressed
jurisdictional claims in absolute terms, giving no hint that ordinary
legislation could expand jurisdiction or that CRS lawyers were
simultaneously arguing that the Supreme Court should relax those
jurisdictional limitations.
To see why I interpret these exaggerated jurisdictional claims as
efforts to defuse and depoliticize encounters with letter writers,
compare the claims to a hypothetical alternative strategy. The CRS
could have written reply letters saying that the federal government
had instantaneously assessed the complaint, determined that the
problem was not serious or credible enough to be worthy of the few
symbolic resources that the administration had allotted to address
rights violations, and consequently chosen not to help. Such replies
would have drawn more direct attention to the Roosevelt
administration's discretionary and political choices about where to
use resources.
I am not prepared to argue that honesty is the best policy, and
my point here is not to attack the CRS. I do want to ask whether
something in the nature of government-sponsored litigation
campaigns necessarily leads government attorneys to dissociate
themselves from ordinary political engagement. Is it particularly
difficult or impractical for government attorneys to simultaneously
engage in a more contentious politics of change through ordinary
political processes like building public support for legislative
change? In what ways do litigation strategies foreclose other
methods that activist government officials could otherwise use to
build political support for policy change?
Such questions seem important given the courts' limited
institutional capacities to create policy change without political
support. McCann and others have defended rights-based litigation
strategies by claiming that litigation can be integrated into broader
efforts to build movements and engage in ordinary politics.
Thurgood Marshall was certainly not detached from ordinary politics
or from the NAACP's movement-building and maintenance needs. 122

122. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 184-99 (2004); MARK V.
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But in the CRS case, government attorneys routinely eschewed
opportunities to work with citizens as political allies and instead
deployed adversarial legalistic rhetoric in an apparent effort to make
potential allies go away quietly.
It is difficult to say whether the findings in the CRS case can be
generalized to other efforts by government lawyers to expand rights
remedies through experimental litigation. Some general elements of
government legal practice do seem likely to create a tendency to
move away from political engagement. Government officials-even
when they share general policy goals with complaining
constituents-may inevitably end up in an adversarial relationship
with citizen complainants who demand government resources and
attention. Both sides often see the relationship as something very
different from the relationship between an advocacy organization and
voluntary members of groups that the organization is trying to
help. 123 Moreover, government attorneys may have to worry about
engaging in visible efforts to build public support for constitutional
changes concerning rights. Judges, especially recently, often unite
across ideological lines to preserve their judicial prerogative to lead
and direct constitutional development. The Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts have been particularly unhappy about efforts to expand rights
beyond Court-established ceilings. The Court has evolved over the
past three decades from a counter-majoritarian protector of minority
rights to an institution that frequently prevents elected officials from
expanding the rights of discrete and insular minorities. 124
IV. CONCLUSION
Is it inevitable that activist, well-intentioned government
attorneys are forced by their positions to turn away from political
engagement with supportive elements of the public? The single
example of the CRS cannot provide a general answer to that
question. However, the case does point out some reasons for thinking
it likely that government attorneys typically avoid combining
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936-1961, at 42-43 (1994).

123. Things may not be this simple, however. Goluboff finds that the NAACP was not very
much more helpful during this same period. GOLUBOFF, supra note 21, at 217-35.
124. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One, 551 U.S. 701
(2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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litigation work with other activities that might nurture public support
for their policy goals. Insider strategies-that is, strategies where one
set of government actors focus exclusively on trying to convince
another set of government officials to change their minds-may be
less likely to produce meaningful and lasting institutional change
than campaigns that enlist outsiders to take part in broader processes
of constitutional politics. The road not taken of greater political
engagement is particularly attractive in this case because so many of
the people who wrote to the CRS were trying to be engaged
constitutional citizens.
The content of the letters reveals that complainants were not
typically just naive supplicants who believed they were automatically
entitled to some legal remedy. They seemed to understand that
government officials had to make discretionary decisions about when
to devote scarce resources to the problems reported in these letters.
In addition, there is no direct evidence demonstrating that letter
writers actually believed the CRS's claims that it was impossible for
the federal government to provide any help. A substantial number of
letter writers (12 percent) wrote back to the CRS and challenged the
department's legal claims about federal jurisdiction. Thus, while the
CRS's efforts to use legal claims to depoliticize encounters are
understandable, they do not appear to have been very successful.
In addition, the letters suggest that the CRS missed substantial
opportunities to engage and mobilize a supportive public. The voice
of the people that emerges from my sample of letters seems, by
today's standards, quite a bit more attractive than the voice expressed
by the government officials who responded to their letters or the
judges who ruled on CRS test cases. Many letter writers expressed
strong commitments to core constitutional values of due process and
equal protection. Numerous writers articulated (quite movingly) the
problems that petty corruption and poor management of state
officials caused and made structural arguments about the need for the
national government to act as an essential check on state officials.
Writers also illustrated constitutional problems by giving voice to
heartbreaking stories about unlawful detentions or police brutality,
arbitrary commitment to state mental hospitals, unwarranted loss of
child custody to state welfare officials, and abusive treatment after
crossing state lines in search of work.
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As has already been noted, federal capacity to protect civil rights
has expanded dramatically since the letters were written. The
Department of Justice now has an entire division devoted to civil
rights. In addition, Congress has created and funded numerous new
federal regulatory offices devoted to rights protection. A large
network of federal civil rights statutes has replaced the few scattered
provisions of Reconstruction-Era laws that the CRS used. There
remains much to criticize about the adequacy of remedies for rights
violations in the United States, but rights protection has indisputably
become more meaningful and robust since the CRS was founded.
Today, the police officer who murdered Private Broadus on a
Baltimore street would be much more likely to be prosecuted and
punished under federal civil rights laws, if not by state authorities.
One of the Court's opinions-co-authored by Roosevelt
appointees Justices Robert Jackson and Felix Frankfurter-embraced
Dunning School historiography 2' 5 and dismissed Reconstruction as a
"vengeful" period. 126 Although the opinion railed that the federal
prosecution "relieved" the state of responsibility for prosecuting the
sheriff, its authors knew that the state would never have prosecuted
Screws. 12' The opinion also referred to Robert Hall, the man Screws
murdered, as a "lad." 128 Hall was an adult, a father, a worker, and a
constitutional citizen.

12

I can, at the end of the day, understand the CRS's jurispathic
efforts to defuse politicized encounters by making exaggerated
claims about federal jurisdiction. But I also think it regrettable that
the very committed CRS attorneys were not able to engage more
fully the constitutional citizens who so often expressed quite
admirable visions of where the Constitution should be headed.

125.

ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,

at xx-xxiv

(Peter Smith Publisher Inc. 2d ed. 2001) (1988).
126. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 140 (1944) (Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson, JJ.,
dissenting).
127. Id. at 139.

128. Id. at 138.
129. Troutt, supra note 77, at 27-52.

120

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW RE VIE W

[Vol. 44:91

